Although totally overlooked by mainstream aesthetic
theory, various paths were nevertheless left open for addressing everyday
aesthetics, a natural yet surprisingly controversial topic. Why they were never taken until recently,
when the theme of everyday aesthetics is now becoming fashionable, can be
explained not only by the obvious fact of philosophical aesthetics’ restrictive
focal point on art but, among other reasons, by a kind of fetishism that
demands an object of recognized value for legitimating an aesthetic inquiry. This new popularity entails, however, certain
theoretical risks such as clinging to traditional art-centric and
beauty-centric categories to explain the everyday and borrowing their concepts
uncritically. In this paper I will
examine some of these paths and risks with special emphasis on current events
which exude aesthetics throughout their pores and require attention from this
advertisement, category mistakes, everyday
aesthetics, kitsch, pragmatism, propaganda, prosaics, religious rituals,
1. Introduction 
Everyday aesthetics, as the array behaviors, values, and
preferences related to human sensibility, has been practiced throughout the historical
development of each and every culture. Already
a million and a half years ago, Homo
erectus or Homo ergaster manufactured Acheulean stone hand
axes not for utility alone, leaving testimony of a feeling for symmetry,
dexterity, and grace that still has a power to captivate us today. Material cultures in the most diverse social
and natural settings testify to this absolutely intimate relation between the
aesthetic and the everyday in body painting and ritual dances, in funerary and agrarian
ceremonies, in carved and decorated utensils, in embroidered and colorful
clothing, through vernacular clay, stone, and wood dwellings up to the most
sophisticated and complex artworks. Artists
have been constantly aware of this role of aesthetics in everyday life and
expressed it eloquently through all artistic languages: incorporating acoustically
nature’s sounds and daily songs in music; verbally depicting everyday
situations, feelings and tribulations in literature and theater, or visually
enhancing the grace of animals, the grandeur of space or the sheer materiality of
clothes and domestic items by painters like Vermeer, Van Eyck, Velazquez, among
As an important field of interest, however, it is surprising
how long it took aesthetics to seriously and theoretically address the everyday,
despite of the fact that various paths had been open in
this direction by important philosophical schools. To begin with, Socrates’ deliberation on
beauty began taking a chariot wheel, a vase, and a lady as cases in point when
discussing with Hippias. David Hume
considered problems of taste in quite general, not exclusively artistic, terms. The dramatic character of some landscapes was
behind Kant’s idea of the sublime. His
pre-critical reflections on beauty and the sublime where dedicated not only to
art but to an everyday if stereotyped and sometimes hilarious view of various ethnic
groups. Already at the beginning of the twentieth century
Max Dessoir and Emil Utitz marked a distinction between Ästhetik as a theory of beauty and Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft a General Science of Art.
This division was not particularly helpful for an everyday aesthetic, but it
certainly cooperated in making a distinction between aesthetics and art theory. It was John Dewey who, more directly,
acknowledged the rhythms, energies, doings and undergoings of everyday life as
the basis for more elaborate artistic experience.
His view, from a pragmatist perspective, was very complex, also involving
Recent attention to everyday aesthetics mainly consists
in selecting certain everyday items and categories for their contemplative
suitability according to their conformity to the standards of beauty in traditional,
mostly Western aesthetics. The novelty
now consists in including for aesthetic discourse and official museum exhibits
non-artistic items, such as chic design and fashion objects, mass-produced
collectibles, settings and landscapes, vintage articles, and traditional exotic
or popular vernacular crafts. Others include personal experiences in walking
through a lane, musing, or enjoying a particular task. Everyday aesthetics, seen from this
perspective, points at the pleasure potential these multiple objects and
actions can offer, particularly to those best acquainted with the trends in the
art world, and assesses their beauty and value accordingly. If aesthetics is now defined as a road for
well being and a question of pleasure, why not consider it part of the
discipline of hedonics, as Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz have named it?
If aesthetics is to be confined to this single
category of beauty, I often wondered, why not honor language, such an efficient
tool for bridging minds, and give it its proper name? I suggest ‘Beautology’ or more elegantly, ‘Omorphiology’ or ‘Kallology.’ In fact, nothing
in the term ‘aesthetic’ itself implies the concept of beauty nor any particular
value or act of judgment. This
association of the aesthetic with beauty and the judgment of taste appears to
have developed from a disloyal reading of Kant, who clearly distinguished two
kinds of judgments: the teleological, which is an objective judgment, and the
aesthetic, which is subjective. Kant
dedicated a great part of his third Critique
to discuss beauty, the arts, and the sublime.
Even if it appears to be an oxymoron, he was looking for a standard to
objective subjective judgments. He never
defined aesthetics as a theory of beauty or of judgment but the other way
round: he defined certain judgments as aesthetic because they are subjective.
judgment of taste is, therefore, not a judgment of knowledge; thus, it is not
logical, but aesthetic, if we understand by this that the determining base of
which cannot be but subjective. If in a judgment […the representations …] are
only referred to the subject (his
feeling), this judgment is always aesthetic.”
Moreover, aesthetics was never only about artworks,
things, possessions, objects, artifacts, neither etymologically nor in its
theoretical foundation. Even art does
not consist solely of objects, as
Berleant clearly emphasizes this “unquestioned and inviolable dogma.” It
originally was about aisthesis: scientia
cognitionis sensitivae. In his
unfinished yet foundational Latin work Aesthetica
(1750), Baumgarten clearly separated the first part, Aesthetica Theoretica,
from the Aesthetica Practica, and partially developed only the former that was
to consist of Heuristica, Methodologia, and Semiotica. Its
subject matter was not art or beauty but the faculty of sensibility as
“inferior knowledge” derived from our corporeal senses. To some extent this mistaken synonymy of aesthetics
and art may have developed from his best known work on poetry, Meditationes
philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus which, by the way, is
more interesting from a semiotic than an aesthetic perspective. It is
regrettable that even a field which initially emerged around the inquiry of aisthesis
dealing with processes involved in experiencing, sensing, perceiving (all
occurring by definition only in subjects), has been seized by this widespread
2. The Best of All Possible Artworlds
scholars hold on fast and hard to their Panglossianism by assuming that
aesthetics deals only with the best of all possible experiences in this best of
all possible artworlds. They insist on
the exclusive authority conveyed upon a select few for judging what should or
should not be appreciated, approved, or censured for lack or for possession of
a specific kind of value: the so-called “aesthetic value” (a concept still missing
an operative and clear definition). As I
mentioned, such a view presupposes the aesthetic as an honorific title
conferred upon objects for their gratification potential. As the discipline opens up a little to
encompass discussion on non-artistic topics, we are now allowed to judge, enjoy,
and confer such aesthetic title to these other artifacts as long as we leave
the beauto-centric and object-centric foundation intact. At some point, we will have no other choice
but to hire our own private aesthetician to instruct us on the appropriateness
or impropriety of appreciating not only artworks but now also everyday objects. We all want to be aesthetically correct,
As part of this aesthetic Panglossianism one can say
that there seems to be a consensus around a kind of “categorical agreement with being” in
Milan Kundera’s words. This means that
“the aesthetic ideal of the categorical
agreement with being is a world in which faeces are denied and everyone
acts as if they do not exist. This
aesthetic ideal is called kitsch.” Kundera asserts that “kitsch is the absolute
negation of faeces; in a literal and figurative sense, kitsch eliminates from
its point of view everything that in human existence is essentially
new trend in everyday aesthetics appears to be going in a direction in which
certain objects are selected by their potential for supplying contemplative,
pleasing results. If they do, according
to the art institution’s criteria, they pass the discipline’s test and are
conferred the title of “aesthetic” in a peculiar combination of the hedonistic
and judgmental view of this field. This
practice of indexing, cataloging, and presenting certain objects as candidates
for appreciation to a select group of experts and appraisers defines the
artworld, as Danto and Dickie have extensively argued.
reasonable that art, as an opportunity for a hard-to-please audience’s
recreation and as a juicy business for investors and speculators in the art
market, demands experts for calculating the value of their assets, as well as
estimating the artistic patrimony of museums and similar institutions. Marketing and design would also be
significantly interested in aestheticians’ contributions to a better
understanding of likes and dislikes held by diverse sectors of a given society
in order to secure investments and devise efficient baits for consumption. Yet aesthetics need not be confined to
3. A Categorical Agreement with Being
Aesthetics as a discipline has been committed to such a
“categorical agreement with being”
for 250 years by confining itself to highlight beauty (apart from a very few
exceptions) despite the fact that artistic production has explored and
expressed a much wider variety of categories, not precisely beauty: the
monstrous, the ridiculous, the absurd, the bizarre, the uncanny, the pathetic,
the glorious, the cute, the cool, the glossy.
There is nothing wrong with enjoying the delights of beauty, but we must
acknowledge that, in structuring experience, the aesthetic may be triggered
also, and often much more intensively, by the bleakness in supermarkets, the
sordid quality of cheap hotels and grimy bars, the revolting aspect of city
slums, the starkness of public schools and hospitals, a sort of creepiness in
parking lots, the oppressive storing and piling up of human beings in massive
orthogonal multifamily modular compounds and other equally hostile environments
so widespread in contemporary urban life.
is no need to spoil the party for those who maintain aesthetics exclusively as
the theory of beauty and of proper and correct judgments of taste. But to restrict aesthetics to this self-gratifying
task may perhaps be comparable to reducing medical practice to plastic surgery.
Trying to understand how was it possible that a
civilized, educated society that enabled such minds and sensibilities as Bach’s,
Kant’s, Goethe’s, Beethoven’s and those of numerous outstanding artists and
scholars and yet was capable of inconceivable atrocities (a question raised by
George Steiner in Bluebeard’s Castle)
took me to first come to terms with the key role non-artistic aesthetics
acquired during the nazification of Germany. Although Nazi art, specifically its leader’s,
excelled in kitsch, I am referring to the aesthetic display through the whole
paraphernalia designed by Speer, Goebbels, Riefenstahl and their Führer which includes NASDAP ceremonies,
swastikas, goose-step marches and stiff salutes, uniforms, enormous banners,
songs, films, slogans, massive assemblies, flags, monumental architecture,
theatricalizations, school rituals, weapon display, military and State-organized
pageants and the like. This reality necessarily forces us to
recognize the crucial social role of both the aesthetics of violence (in war
propaganda, videogames and in cinema) and the violence of aesthetics (in
numbing sensibilities). Does it mean
that aesthetics can heal? Definitely; but it can also harm.
Apart from its intimate relation with propaganda,
aesthetics is also closely linked to the expression of social status. When in 1984 I was working on an assignment
for a monumental artwork installation at a museum, I was planning to convey how
social class differences all end up and are expressed by aesthetic differences. As Veblen sharply argued in his Theory of the Leisure Class, status is
manifested by ostentatious consumption, which generally devolves into ostentatious aesthetics, as if the craving for status
would necessarily be expressed by aesthetic excess. More luxurious mansions, vintage and sports
cars, stylish clothes, lavish gardens, opulent antiques and art collections, and
sumptuous banquets are perpetual temptations for status cravers, displayers,
and climbers. Even when I finally
decided stripping the resulting piece to the basics and presenting a
monstrously disproportional artwork reflecting the gruesome imbalance of
income, (Histogram 1985, based on the
census on distribution of income) my interest in the topic remained. By 1991, my Ph.D. dissertation Aesthetics and Power (Estética
y Poder) dealt with this subject from a Foucaultian perspective of power
resulting from strategies among which the aesthetic is most salient.
Today, after six published books on everyday aesthetics, from Prosaica (1994, an introduction to everyday
aesthetics) to the more recent Everyday
Aesthetics (2007) and tens of papers on the subject, I can not deny this
has been, quite obsessively, my main topic of research and teaching for more
than twenty years.
What, then, can I offer as a conclusion from this long path?
of all, we must face the problem of dealing with such a complex and unframed
subject matter. The main reaction one
gets at the mere proposal of a non-artistic aesthetics is its disqualification
for panestheticism, implying that if everything is aesthetic, the topic becomes
trivial (many of my papers during the nineties were rejected by publishers for this reason). This problem was foreseen and addressed by
Mukarovský, who recognized that any object and any action can become a vehicle
for the aesthetic function but warned that "this does not imply a panaesthetic
affirmation, since: 1) it does not affirm the necessity, but solely the general
possibility of the aesthetic function; 2) it does not question the dominant
position of the aesthetic function among the remaining functions of given
phenomena; 3) one is not to conflate the aesthetic function with other
functions, nor to conceive other functions as mere variants of the aesthetic
function." I would add that nothing is aesthetic; in
fact no thing can be so, since
aesthesis is the condition of subjectivity.
In this sense I would like to acknowledge a
ground-breaking yet unpretentious book on everyday aesthetics. Written a quarter of a century ago it fully
engages in the very risky, slippery field of an experience-based approach to
the aesthetic, yet manages to come out unharmed. I am referring to Joseph Kupfer’s Experience as Art, Aesthetics in Everyday Life.
I regret not having come across it before and giving it its proper place on my
reflection upon the state of the art in my books. Kupfer insightfully goes to the core of what
everyday aesthetics is about by stressing its educational, political, moral,
and social implications from a firm pragmatist approach. He presents an eloquent case and dedicates a
whole chapter to aesthetics’ relation to violence in two instances: as
assertive violence and as ultraviolence, opening up a new and badly needed
field for aesthetic inquiry upon negative aesthetics, a path left open by
4. Category Mistakes
Among other results from my investigation, I was able
to detect very frequent category mistakes in aesthetic studies that have
hindered paying attention to everyday sensibility:
most common is the oxymoron in the notion of “aesthetic objects,” when no
object, by definition, can be aesthetic, namely sensitive, capable of
sensibility. When people in general
speak of “aesthetic objects” what they really mean is “pretty objects” or the equivalent. The term is used as an approving, flattering
remark and not in a descriptive, much less theoretical sense.
second is the tautology of “aesthetic sensibility” which is a redundancy since
these two terms are in fact synonyms: aesthetics denotes and involves
sensibility by definition. Other terms
such as “sensibility to penicillin” are derived from this original sense of sentience
3. The conflation
of “the aesthetic” and “the artistic.” Subjects are, by definition, aesthetic since
subjectivity equals sensibility. Objects
are not aesthetic but they can be or not be artistic, depending on social
dimensions and institutions. Institutions
(familial, governmental, religious, educational, sport, arts and entertainment,
juridical, medical, etc.) constitute the cultural and professional topography
by which a given social group organizes its creeds, activities, and division of
work, status and labor. By contrast,
dimensions (semiotic, technological, aesthetic, economic, political) cross
through all these institutions and are dynamic, practical, material and constructive
forces that shape and determine the matrices. Basically,
the artistic is an institution
whereas the aesthetic is a dimension
that traverses through the artistic as well as through other institutions and
is in charge of providing perceptible elements to enhance and distinguish the
various institutional identities.
Kant, aisthesis broadly involves the interplay of imagination and
understanding, and for pragmatists such as Dewey, there are rhythms and forms
of sensibility, responsiveness, reciprocity, doings and undergoings,
receptivity, awareness and attentiveness, sense and feeling, in short: vibrant,
pulsating subjectivity. Aesthetics can
focus on artistic experience or ‘poetics‘
(Aristotle’s term) or upon the non-artistic or everyday, for which I have
selected the term ‘prosaics.’ In his Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism,
Charles Sanders Peirce defined Logic as a normative science in regard to
representations of truth, Ethics in regard to efforts of will, and Esthetics in
objects considered simply in their presentation.
Along this line, one can say that everyday life is a matter of presence, as prosaics
is a matter of presentation, and poetics a matter of re-presentation.
5. A Model for the Analysis of Everyday
In order to observe these structures of experience
(artistic or not), I proposed in my book, Everyday Aesthetics: Prosaics, the Play of Culture and Social Identities, a methodological
device similar to the green and red lenses one wears to discern otherwise
imperceptible visual effects, as in the 1954 stereoscopic film The Creature
from the Black Lagoon or the recent Avatar, except that in this case we must wear 8 lenses instead of two. I am
referring to an octadic model based on semiotics for aesthetic inquiry, consisting of the four
registers of perception/communication and four modalities of dramaturgical
display. These four registers are our
normal means or channels of expression and communication with others in
everyday life, consisting of the lexic
or words, acoustic or sounds, somatic or body language, and the scopic or visual and spatial
manifestations. Naturally, we display
the same registers of prosaics in poetics or art: lexic in literature and
poetry, acoustic in music, somatic in dance and theater, and scopic in painting
and sculpture. Since we usually
communicate in hybrid registers simultaneously involving words, sound, body and
the visual, this distinction is purely analytical. Each register enables structuring experience
and impacting on recipients’ sensibility in different ways. By
“modalities” I denote various forms of attitudinal displays, such as distancing
or proxemics, dynamics or kinetics, accent or emphatics, and open and closed
fluidity or fluxion. Sixteen
combinations are thus possible (which could become 32 if we consider two
degrees of intensity: positive and negative).
6. Aesthetic Displays in Social Institutions
As I have argued extensively in my books, we can
explore the processes of aisthesis in various social contexts, specifically
through all cultural institutions characterized by the manner or form in which
they structure our experience. Thus we
have specific and regulated aesthetic forms and practices through all
institutions in a given society. Let us
examine a few:
Family. The primeval context that configures our
experience in a particular way is the family.
A family is framed within the walls or fences of each home which
constitutes its setting or staging. Decoration,
props, clothing, gadgets, habitual intonation in verbal exchanges, the tone of
voice and verbosity in communication among members, the particular types of
music or its absence at home, the body proximity or distance among family
members and types of interaction all affect the form and quality of experience
within that family. How seasons and
festivities are marked within the family cycles, as with Christmas trees,
Passover celebrations, weekends, birthdays, meals, morning and evening rhythms,
division of tasks, the place given to each person at the table, the clutter,
frugality, the ambience at home, all configure the family members’ everyday
Religion. The most impressive non-artistic
aesthetic displays have been performed within religious institutions. Religious aesthetics is related not only to
paintings, sculptures, architecture, and music on religious topics usually
considered “religious art.” More
importantly, it reflects the way our
experience is configured to generate the belief in each religion’s world view
and to arouse devotion towards certain ideas, persons, objects, and places. The religious universe is thus experienced
when attending temples and performing celebrations which engage and give form
to our experience of the sacred. The
grace and order of the choreography, the music, the intricate setting and carefully
detailed clothing, the words rhythmically and solemnly pronounced, the scent of
incense, paraffin and flowers appealing to the body, the elegance in the
ritual, all endow our experience with a sense of harmony and the idea of
holiness, or with fear and trembling. Religious
aesthetics has been the main source for organized aesthetic nourishment in many
people’s lives for millennia.
Advertisement. By aesthetic strategies, marketing and
commercial ads fabricate pleasant, intriguing or smart connotations for
products attaching friendly, desirable or successful “identities” to the brands
and commodities they promote. Witty
commercials are able to trigger precise associations, as in Apple Macintosh
computer’s initial ad inspired by Orwell’s 1984,
designed to appeal to young, intelligent, and well informed potential consumers,
who would associate the experience created by the ad (thrill, surprise, dexterity,
and wit) with the commodity marketed.
These ads may not be artworks but they undeniably display aesthetic strategies
to structure the imaginary experience of possessing a certain object.
Sports. The aesthetics of sports is salient.
Each Olympic opening ceremony is aesthetically designed for moving the
global audience. In particular, sport
aesthetics are irrefutable in the perfect grace and dexterity of so many
athletes, like Nadia Comaneci’s all tens 1976 Montreal performance and Yelena
Isinbayeva’s 2008 Beijing pole-vault jump puts this topic in the right
perspective. Yet many fellow aestheticians, among them Welsch,
still require an artistic justification to argue for the aesthetic character of
Kupfer describes the rich experiential process involved in sports in his
body-electric chapter. As he observes,
there are qualitative or “formal” sports whose excellence is equivalent to
beauty of movement.
Military. The military institution strongly
depends not only on the practical effectiveness of martial tactics but on
implementing an aesthetic impact for various goals: intimidation, drafting,
cohesion, discipline, legitimation, and so on.
The astonishing imagination invested in the aesthetic production of weapons
exhibited in museums, from masks and armor to decorated swords and shields for
the military, expresses the vehemence dedicated to the aesthetics of war.
State. As with the military, government institutions
also recruit and display great talent for aesthetic production, particularly
during presidential campaigns, where aesthetics can be crucial in impacting
potential voters’ sensibilities and changing the tide of events. We can testify the bandwagon effect in full
force during electoral periods, frequently triggered by aesthetic devices. TV campaign commercials attempt to target
citizens aesthetically or emotionally rather than rationally, as the famous Hillary
Clinton’s ad, “It’s 3 A.M.” During the 2008 USA presidential elections, both
parties included Mexican mariachi music to appeal to Latino voters, yet none
was explicit on the illegal migrant population problems and suggested solutions.
7. Exuding Aesthetics
The masterpiece of electoral aesthetics is the Yes We Can video, seen at least about 24
million times in YouTube and Dipdive. The
lyrics were taken from Barack Obama’s New
Hampshire presidential primary speech, and the music
and assemblage was performed by Will.i.am.
Jesse Dylan made the black and
It seems it was all voluntary, enthusiastic work, not commissioned by the
Applying the Octadic model very briefly to this video,
we can clearly appreciate in the lexic register, the eloquence, rhythm and suggestive
images evoked by the speech, with an effective religious flavor conveyed by the
“yes we can” chorus (as the “I like Ike” Eisenhower slogan).
It was a creed written into the founding documents that declared the
destiny of a nation. Yes we can.
It was whispered by slaves and abolitionists as they blazed a trail
towards freedom. Yes we can.
It was sung by immigrants as they struck out from distant shores and
pioneers who pushed westward against an unforgiving wilderness. Yes we can.
It was the call of workers who organized; women who reached for the
ballots; a President who chose the moon as our new frontier; and a King who
took us to the mountaintop and pointed the way to the Promised Land.
Yes we can to justice and equality.
Yes we can.[...W]e are one people; we are one nation; and together, we will
begin the next great chapter in the American story with three words that will
ring from coast to coast; from sea to shining sea--
Yes We Can.
kinetics and emphatics, Obama’s speech is both the rhythmic background for
people’s words and, vice versa, people’s words are the background for Obama’s in
euphony and polyphonic harmony, efficiently creating the sense that the
candidate represents their ideas and dreams and is one with them. The acoustic proxemics and emphatics of Obama’s
voice in both tone and warm timbre produce a sense of proximity, and the
candidate and performers’ open and relaxed fluxion is convincing. The “Yes we can” slogan almost becomes an
“amen” choir and a percussion drum accompaniment. Somatically all performers appear receptive,
content, and even joyful, with a relaxed attitude in both body language and
facial expression. They unify, in the
same rhythm and sound, a feeling that invites empathy, keeping consistency
between both the acoustic and the somatic registers. On the scopic or visual, the video was prepared
in black and white, which helps convey a sense of sincerity and frugality, but
also creates a special atmosphere verging almost on the reverential. Visually attractive young celebrities of
different ethnic backgrounds wear casual, simple, everyday clothes, shortening
proxemics which helps identification by the audience. It is not presented as a spectacular show-off
but almost as a random frame in the natural stream of events in everyday life. The “Yes we can” slogan associated to Luther
King’s “I have a dream” and a background crescendo of “We want change” voices, enhanced
by patriotic resonances from the America the Beautiful stanza “from sea to shining sea” surges to a
climactic effect, and blends the “hope” and “vote” words in red.
To conclude, we crave aesthetically promising
configurations for the pleasure or thrill we can derive from them. This craving explains how and why a baptism
ceremony, a vacation trip or a football game, a birthday party or a community
ritual, a political meeting with a charismatic leader or a school graduation contribute
to captivate our feelings or capture our imagination in ways that we recognize,
not always consciously, but that nonetheless guide our decisions and determine
the kind of life we lead.
Being sensitive creatures, aesthetics is always
involved in various spheres of our natural, cultural, and social activities,
and it is important to be aware of it. Its efficacy for moving people’s emotions is constantly
squeezed out by politics’ and marketing’s aesthetic engineering. Millions of people are enjoying the
deliberate production of an aesthetics of violence through the film and
videogame industry, and other millions are undergoing violence against their
sensibility in numbing routines, gender oppression, and inhospitable life
conditions. The number of teens consuming
addictive drugs keeps growing, pointing to a deterioration in the condition of
their sensibility by the stimuli they are deprived of but urgently need. Yet some aestheticians seem to prefer the
trivial task of going around the world authorizing or de-authorizing what
should or should not be aesthetically appreciated, to the less pleasurable one
of trying to cope, even if at least conceptually, with these other more complex
and socially crucial issues.
Milan Kundera once wrote: “Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear says: How nice to see children
running on the grass! The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with
all mankind, by children running on the grass.
It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch.”
Aestheticians have discovered a third tear that trickles down our professional
cheeks in feeling How nice to be moved,
together with all aestheticians, by the correct things to appreciate! I am convinced we can do much better than
this aesthetic correctness.
is Professsor of Aesthetics and Semiotics at Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Mexico City. She is President of Asociación Mexicana de Estudios en Estética
and Second Vice-President of the International Association for
Aesthetics, and has published five books in Spanish and one in
English, as well as numerous scholarly papers.
Published on December 30, 2010.
 A previous
version of this paper was originally presented at “Everyday Aesthetics,” 8th
International Summer School (2008), Institute
of Applied Aesthetics, Lahti, Finland.
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comunicación: de acción, pasión y seducción (Bogota: Editorial Norma,
2006); Katya Mandoki, Estética cotidiana
y juegos de la cultura: Prosaica 1 (México, DF: Siglo XXI Editores, 2006);
Katya Mandoki, Prácticas estéticas e
identidades sociales ; Prosaica 2 (México D.F: Siglo XXI Editores, 2006);
Katya Mandoki, La construcción estética
del estado y de la identidad nacional; Prosaica 3 (México, DF: Siglo XXI
 Jan. Mukarovský, Escritos de estetica y semiotica del arte,
ed. Hanna Anthony–Visová (trad.) (Barcelona:
Gustavo Gili., 1977), p. 47, translation mine.
 Joseph H. Kupfer, Experience
as Art: Aesthetics in Everyday Life (New York: SUNY Press, 1983).
 I was surprised to find precisely this title in
Berleant’s simultaneous paper at “Everyday Aesthetics,” 8th
International Summer School (2008), Institute
of Applied Aesthetics, Lahti, Finland.
Katya Mandoki, Everyday Aesthetics: Prosaics, the Play of Culture and Social Identities, Part 6. Katya Mandoki, Prácticas
estéticas e identidades sociales; Prosaica 2.
 Charles Sanders
Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.36, 1903.
 Charles Sanders Peirce and Patricia Ann Turrisi, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method
of Right Thinking: the 1903 Harvard... (New
York: SUNY Press, 1997).
 I developed these distinctions in my paper, “A Model for Aesthetic Analysis
in Poetics and in Prosaics,” in Lahti during the XIII International Congress of Aesthetics, “Aesthetics in Practice,” (1995).
 Katya Mandoki, Everyday Aesthetics: Prosaics, the Play of Culture and Social Identities (Aldershot
UK: Ashgate Pub Co, 2007).
 For a full explanation of each category and
application see Katya Mandoki, Everyday Aesthetics: Prosaics, the Play of Culture and Social Identities. Katya Mandoki, Prácticas
estéticas e identidades sociales; Prosaica 2.
 On the aesthetics of Christian, Judaic and Islamic
religions see Katya Mandoki, Everyday Aesthetics: Prosaics, the Play of Culture and Social Identities, Chapter 28.
 Wolfgang Welsch, “Sport--Viewed Aesthetically, and
Even as Art?” in The Aesthetics of
Everyday Life, ed. Andrew Light and Jonathan M. Smith
(Columbia University Press., 2005).
 Joseph H. Kupfer, Experience
as Art: Aesthetics in Everyday Life, pp. 111-140.
 Milan Kundera,
The Unbearable Lightness of Being, pp 251.