is mostly approached from a contextualist perspective where “art” refers to
objects that are presented and appreciated within socially recognized art
institutions. Artification then means
that the notion of art is extended to non-art areas. Yet it can be argued that contextualism is
circular, since it starts with an unquestioned assumption about what art is. Another weakness of contextualism is that by
privileging theory it tends to downplay the role of creative and appreciative
practices. Alternative approaches are
possible, and this article explores in a preliminary way what a naturalist
approach could mean for how we see art and artification processes. The naturalist approach developed here considers
the arts first of all as cultural practices
that evolve together with discourse, but where discourse is not privileged over
practice. As Wittgenstein suggested,
understanding (and skillfully practicing) any art is about socially mediated,
long-term engagement. By analyzing the
evolutionary and onto-genetic origins of art and its function in all human
cultures, and by describing the criteria of art as a cluster, naturalism opens
the border between art and non-art. With
naturalism, we can ask whether some of the changes described as artification
allow us to recognize art outside institutionally legitimized art worlds. It allows us to ask to what extent something
is art; it provides a perspective where phenomena can be studied case by case;
and it re-introduces the relevance of evaluative criteria in the process of
identifying or recognizing art.
contextualism, naturalism, theories of art, Wittgenstein
suggests that things that have formerly not been regarded as art have recently
started to be seen as art. As a
descriptive term, it thematizes cultural change of a kind that is closely
related to aestheticization, described by Wolfgang Welsch as processes whereby
“the unaesthetic is made, or understood to be, aesthetic.” Welsch points out
that this means different things in different contexts: beautification,
stylization, virtualization and, in the epistemic sphere, giving up the search
for firm foundations and accepting the relative and hermeneutic nature of our
life-world. Artification does not claim quite so much in
terms of changes in world-views, yet it opens a wealth of questions. Some of them are about the drivers behind
this development: are they commercial,
educational, critical, artistic, or related to well-being and quality of life?
Others are about the main areas of artification and its boundaries, if these
can be identified, since a central feature of artification is that it spreads
to ever new non-art areas like business, healthcare, politics, education,
everyday life, and virtually every sector of society.
central question of this article is simpler but perhaps more fundamental: Is artification ultimately about extending the notion of art to non-art
areas, thereby transfiguring certain objects and practices into art; or can at
least some of these changes be better described as recognizing art in areas outside the institutionally legitimized
art worlds? How
we answer the question has consequences for how we see art in its wider
contexts of human culture and society. In
contemporary theory of art, there are two main alternatives. One is contextualist and historicist, that art
is a historical phenomenon that evolved in the West, and the concept cannot be
applied to objects and practices of other cultures and times without distorting
them. The other is naturalist, that art
is a universal and central human practice though it takes different forms in
two alternatives differ fundamentally in how they understand art and explain
its existence, while there is overlap, not unexpectedly, in the identification
of what counts as art. Nonetheless, they
constitute two alternative perspectives on what goes on in artification. It seems that it is the
constructionist-contextualist view that has the upper hand at the moment. I am interested, however, in exploring the
naturalist perspective for at least two reasons. One is to analyze the suggestion that in
artification non-art is made into art or made art-like. Can this be taken for granted and what does
it imply? The other is to explore what a naturalist approach means for how we
see art and artification processes. That
said, the exploration of the naturalist approach can only be preliminary.
central resource for the critical analysis and naturalist exploration I use
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s late work, which had a key role in Anglo-American
aesthetic theory in the second half of the twentieth century. Its effect on philosophy at large is aptly called
the "linguistic turn," but the overall effect on aesthetics could better be
termed contextualist. It inspired
philosophers and theorists to turn their attention from works of art to the
networks that surround and maintain art, whether linguistic, pragmatic or
institutional, past or present. Yet the
full implications of Wittgenstein’s thinking for aesthetics and art may not
have been realized.
points in particular are relevant. One
is that whereas Wittgenstein emphasized both how linguistic meaning is embedded
in life-world contexts and language use is itself a practice, the aesthetic and
artistic practices of art makers and audiences have not received enough
attention. In other words, if
essentialist theories made the mistake of “staring at an object,”
contextualist theories may have made the mistake of looking away from the
object and its micro-contexts, from how artists and audiences actually engage
with art. The other point is that
Wittgenstein’s suggestion to look at ordinary language has been somewhat
neglected. There is not much reflection
on what “art” means for amateur art lovers, people who have a keen interest in
art without being professionally
involved in its production or evaluation.
If they emphasized the aesthetic dimension of contemporary art, what conclusions
should be drawn from this? Could one say
that they have not grasped what is essential for art today? But what are the
grounds of such a claim? It seems that the primacy of a certain kind of art –
conceptual – has been taken for granted, and theory is dependent upon it: pending on art.
start by introducing some distinctions that help to characterize the
assumptions, perspectives, and ambitions of different types of theories of art
and sketch their historical context. I then
read the Philosophical Investigations
in the spirit of an appreciative and critical dialogue and with a view to its
implications for art theory. Following
this, I make some points about contextualist theories, focusing on Arthur C. Danto’s “artworld.” Finally, I suggest how
naturalism might approach contemporary artistic, art educational, and
2. Approaching art:
some rough distinctions
is described as referring to “situations
and processes in which something that is not regarded as art in the traditional sense of the word is
changed into art or into something art-like.” Cultural change of the sort described
certainly takes place in many Western societies. Nonetheless, the description of artification
as an extension of art into non-art areas is also puzzling since it seems to
take for granted, rather than analyze, the difference between art and non-art. One way to highlight this is to focus on the
expression “traditional sense of the word.” It suggests that art is a social construct
consisting of a group of phenomena which members of a particular culture just call “art.” But if this is the case,
there should be no problem if they start calling something that resembles art
“art.” The extension of the concept grows wider and the concept itself may
undergo some change, but it is a question of degree rather than of new categories. Nothing dramatic happens; there is just more
Art “in the traditional sense” is a vague notion with regard to the
plural, even heterogeneous, character of what art has been in the last
centuries, even within Western culture. Research
on the history of aesthetics and the arts shows that both the boundaries of art
– what objects and practices count as art at a particular time – and the
suggestions about what is central to art or the arts have varied.
Even “the modern system of the arts”
contains a multitude of artistic practices and theories that sometimes conflict. Admittedly a terminological change took place
in the eighteenth century from arts in the plural to art in the singular. Larry Shiner suggests that despite the
variety of practices and internal differences between the “art worlds and
subworlds” of the modern fine arts system, there are shared “underlying
concepts and ideals.”
Yet within the system there are strong tendencies to broaden the field, to
challenge values, concepts and ideals; to change practices and go outside
institutions. In fact the very roots of
modernism are more multifarious than the term “modern fine arts system”
One can see “artification” within that system, especially within the tradition
of the avant-garde, where one strong tendency was to claim as art things not
formerly considered art.
In many ways, actual works of art, even of art “in the traditional sense,”
form a group that is plural rather than singular. There are several traditional senses rather
than one, not least from the perspective of how art has been construed in
discourse. Whether we want to say that
the modern system of fine art is singular or plural is perhaps more a question
of emphasis and perspective than of fact, since facts can be interpreted in
more than one way. However, if we put a
stronger emphasis on practices than has generally been done, our conclusions
might be different. I explore this later
Let me now turn to the plurality of art theories.
I suggest that we can make some gross distinctions between theories with regard
to their structure and aims, that is, how
they articulate the question about what art is.
What follows is meant as a helpful
perspective on Western art discourse of the last quarter millennium. I suggest that theories differ not only in the characteristics and
functions they claim are central to art – whether as a totality, or system, as
works of art, or activities – but that they also have different epistemic bases
and aims. In the past two hundred and fifty years, three ways of approaching the
question of what art is can be distinguished: essentialism, contextualism, and
by essentialism I mean theory that seeks the key, distinguishing
characteristics of art: its essence. This
could refer to its necessary and sufficient properties, terms used in analytic
philosophy, but essentialism does not operate according to that logic. Essentialist theories of art are historically
linked to the modern fine arts system, since it is here that the question of
what art is arises. I suggest that while
some of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century theories set out to describe the essential characteristics
of art, as of a newly discovered species, there are also theories whose aim was
to establish and defend art as a cultural practice in bourgeois society. Essentialism takes for granted that art
exists and has key properties and functions which may or may not be specific to
a time. The question is one of finding
and naming them, not of giving a logical definition of art. Furthermore, the normative character of these
theories does not result from a naïve conflation between the classificatory and
evaluative sense of ‘art,’ since art is here as a value concept throughout.
Contextualist theories of art evolved in the second half of the twentieth century and were preoccupied with defining art through finding its
necessary and sufficient properties. There
was a new emphasis on the historical, time- and place-specific character of
art: art can be defined only relative to
and in a certain situation. As theorists
agreed that essentialism had failed to specify the distinguishing properties of
works of art, proponents of contextualist theories turned their eyes, on the
one hand, to discourses and thinking about art, exemplified by Arthur C. Danto, and, on the other hand, to practices
of making, presenting and appreciating art, exemplified by George Dickie. The dominant view was that art is a
culturally constructed phenomenon the existence of which is contingent. The definition of art was also disconnected
from evaluation. Despite this,
contextualist theories often take the existence of art for granted in ways that
I try to indicate in section 4, below.
the third approach is naturalism. It is connected to a scientific worldview
that places humans within the context of nature, natural sciences, and the
philosophy of nature. Naturalist theories
of art are found in the early twentieth century and, with new impulses from
evolutionary, cognitive, and infant research, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. They typically see art as
fulfilling evolutionary and cultural functions that are necessary for a
thriving society and a good life. The
approach claims that art is a universal and not a uniquely Western phenomenon. That art exists in all human cultures and has
biological roots, as well as existential and social import, does not however mean
that all art is alike, any more than cultures or languages are. The aim of
naturalist theories is often explanation:
whether of how art evolved in human prehistory;
of its ontogenesis in early childhood; or of its cognitive and communicative
functions. Naturalist theories are
typically not naïve about the existence of art; on the contrary they are
sensitive to the border areas where art arises from or touches non-art.
As they tend to discuss the function of art, there is an inherent normativity
to the concept of art, much like in essentialism.
distinction will be useful as I proceed.
This is one between approaching art as objects on the one hand and as activities
or practices, whether productive or receptive, on the other. Although
essentialist theory did not exclude activities, for example, the artist in
Romantic art theory, in the course of the twentieth century it increasingly
focused on objects or works of art. Contextualist
definitions of art discuss both artworks (objects) and the institutional
practices that surround art but tend to overlook human agency at work in making
and experiencing art. Naturalism, in comparison, shows considerable interest
in the activity of making art and the experience of art probably because it is
interested in the role of art in human life.
3. Practicing language, practicing art
statement that in order to understand the meaning of a word we should look at
how it is used, emphasizes how language is embedded in practices. This evidently means that the meaning of
words arises in the practice of language but, in addition, Wittgenstein suggested
that the practice of language (speaking) is part of other activities or
life-forms. This dimension has not
been fully developed in contextualist or other theories of art. In my
view, it contributes to naturalist
theory. I shall now discuss implications of Wittgenstein’s thinking for our
understanding of art from two angles: the idea that language is in some sense
an environment or space that we inhabit; and the somewhat overlooked dimension
of “play” in Spiel, which has usually
been translated as ”game.”
In Philosophical Investigations,
Wittgenstein compared language to a landscape or an old city. It
is obvious that these metaphors do not refer to landscape as a view or picture
that we inspect but to a space in which the “draughtsman” moves. Similarly, when learning deictic terms, such
as “there” or “this,” what is realized is not only spatial relations outside
language but a spatiality within language.
Therefore, we do not primarily use
language as a tool to describe our thoughts and our world; language rather
articulates where we stand, what we are, and what we think on a more basic
level. Further, as language is
inseparable from our life-world at large, it articulates our world together with other practices or
life-forms, in a relationship of co-constitution.
language as a practice, Wittgenstein observed that a child learns a language by
training, not through explanation. Verbal
meaning is intimate; we rely on language, even live it. This
is not to say that linguistic meaning is innate or non-arbitrary; languages are
different and words have different connotations for different people. Our mother tongue is “second nature” to us,
something we trust and that is inseparable from our world, articulating it and
enabling us to articulate ourselves. Yet
while our thoughts are dependent on language, Wittgenstein showed that they are
not identical with it. We can cope with
language even when concepts are not exactly defined, and there are cases when
we can alter the rules “as we go along.” Such
uncertainty could hardly be tolerable if language itself were the only ground
of verbal communication.
the vocal gestures that are part of speech foreground the intimate relation
between agency and meaning.
Wittgenstein showed us a line of nonsensical scribble and asked the reader to
read it out loud as if it were a sentence.
When we “read” the scribble, he suggested, we do not feel that the
sounds we produce are caused by the line in the way we do when we read a normal
sentence. However, one might say
that we establish the connection when reading the scribble. The sounds are initially contingent but, in
retrospect, their connection to the scribble is constituted through our agency
as we playact reading.
now come to the second theme, namely Wittgenstein’s use of Spiel. It can be translated
as either play or game but has no single equivalent in English. Wittgenstein’s original Spiel is translated and discussed in the English-language secondary
literature mainly as game. Yet, in some
passages of the Investigations, the
aspect of play is evident. My suggestion
is not that we should replace ‘game’ with ‘play’; rather, it is important to
keep the full semantic field in mind and see which meaning fits case by case. To start, there are significant differences
between game and play. Play allows for
more spontaneity, it is less controlled by rules, and less rational. When we play games, we do more than perform
according to rules. Also, play, in
general, is less competitive than games, and there is a deeper degree of
interaction in play as compared to games. Finally, while ‘game’ suggests an entity with clear borders, an object of
sorts, play is more dynamic and open-ended.
Play suggests playing: an activity.
the central examples in Wittgenstein’s exposition of family resemblances. He suggested
that while different games have no single shared property, there is a
connecting network of properties, each of which is shared by some games rather
than by all. One of his examples is a
child who throws a ball against the wall.
Clearly this is more about playing than a game; the activity, not a set
of rules, is foregrounded. But we could
think similarly of the other examples, bearing in mind Wittgenstein’s emphasis
on the social constitution of
language. If “[s]hared human behavior is
the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language,” then language-games and life-forms can hardly
be understood from a third-person perspective.
Our participatory experience is crucial for understanding what is common
to different Spiele. It is not enough, after all, to just “look
dimension of shared human behavior
may need to be better articulated if we are to fully realize the social
character of meaning. My
suggestion is that meaning is confirmed but also established and changed in
actual situations of exchange, where a certain fuzziness or flexibility of
words and concepts is even necessary for new insights to arise. Intentions need to be recognized in order to
become real, much like humor, the existence of which depends on its being
appreciated by others. To understand a
joke, we cannot just look and see; we have to share and participate in a
situation. In his observations on
aesthetic matters, Wittgenstein often brought up this dimension of intersubjectivity. The suggestion that “custom and upbringing
have a hand in” why a style of painting is understood by some but not by all
points to the importance of growing into aesthetic and artistic practices.
consequence of Wittgenstein’s thought is that what something is cannot be
understood by verbal means only. Language
is, and has to be, in touch with a world.
It is highly doubtful that we could explain what art is to someone who
had no experience of similar practices. It
is the participatory knowledge of life practices and agency that makes verbal
communication possible. Furthermore, it
must be emphasized that learning a language and becoming familiar with
practices and life-foms are social processes.
Language is initially shared. Even
in talking to oneself ”we” are involved.
“How should I think” implies “how should one think,” which implies “how
should we think.” And the meaning of utterances shifts only relative to a group
of speakers; meaning has to be recognized in order to exist.
main implication for art is that the language-game of art is much more
intimately embedded in actual life-forms and practices than most contextualist
theories recognize. Another thing to
note is that Wittgenstein privileged actual, ordinary language use. This suggests that, in studying the
language-games and life-forms of art, we should take a broad rather than a
narrow view, including how the word ‘art’ circulates in the worlds of
non-professional audiences and amateur artists rather than focusing merely on
critics, theorists, professional artists’ and other insiders’ discourse. Much of today’s theory and philosophy of art
is a rather narrowly specialized language-game.
‘Art’ may mean something different within this game than outside it. This again actualizes the question of on what
grounds we can decide which view is right, if it is only a question of
philosophy gave important impulses to aesthetics and art theory from the 1950s
onwards. While theorists influenced by
him may disagree on many issues, in general the linguistic turn has led to a
situation where contextualism is dominant; furthermore, it is a contextualism
that emphasizes discourses and thinking rather than practices. In theorizing, art is looked upon from an
observer’s rather than a participant’s perspective.
4. The philosophy
game of art
the first half of the twentieth century essentialist theories of art turned
increasingly towards the work of art, thus marginalizing production and
reception in their attempts to find out what distinguishes art from non-art. But this kind of theory reached an impasse as
various art movements seemed to constantly challenge and even falsify the
definitions that had been proposed. This
prepared the ground for turning the attention from the art objects towards
their contexts. Wittgenstein’s late philosophy
was of crucial importance in this development. The general outcome was that philosophers
interested in how art can be defined turned from works of art towards contexts
and tradition. This way of approaching
art has since been dominant.
most influential theoretical contribution was Arthur C. Danto’s introduction of
the artworld. Danto’s own understanding
of this concept is basically philosophical and historical. ‘Artworld’ refers to
the prevailing way of understanding art in a particular epoch. The artworld is inseparably part of art and
is an explanatory concept:
To see something as art at all demands nothing less
than this, an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art. Art is the kind of thing that depends for its
existence upon theories … the artworld is logically dependent upon theory.
distinction to Wittgenstein’s model, where language and other practices are
interdependent, works of art are here unidirectionally dependent on theory. As B. R. Tilghman wrote, Danto’s artworld “is
entirely a linguistic entity made up of all the things we say, the theories,
interpretations, and descriptions of art available to us.”
Although what exactly “theory” means may to some extent be open, the emphasis
seems to be on disciplinary expertise and conscious reflection. The “art
world” is different from the ordinary one; it is a world of “interpreted things.” Another notable feature is that the question of what art is is formulated as a
question about which objects, or
things, should be included in the category.
This makes the definition exclusive; artworks are strictly separated
from non-art objects. With respect to
the tradition of artistic and aesthetic theory, this strategy narrows the
approach by neglecting theories that have focused on creation or reception. Mimesis or expression, to name but two
traditional core concepts of essentialist approaches, are ambiguous in this
respect; they can refer to production, the object, or appreciation.
constructionist theory singles out reflection as a central feature of contemporary
art. But, at the same time, it operates
on the assumption of a certain kind of art typical of the art scene and markets
of international metropoles, most notably New York. In this respect, there is a lack of
reflection. The claim that “the
definition of art has become part of the nature of art in a very explicit way”
makes sense against the background of dominant art discourses of the visual
arts of the twentieth century. But does
this yield a representative image of all the art even of that time? More
importantly, does the theory even address this matter? Problems that need more thorough discussion
are related to discourse: to the discrepancies between the dominant art
discourse and art practices; to the sometimes polemical character of art
discourse; and to the circularity of art theory.
Another problem is related to the aesthetic dimension of art. Danto deemed aesthetic properties irrelevant
for whether a thing is art or not, which is slightly paradoxical as he also emphasized
that a work of art "embodies its meaning." Yet aesthetic considerations remain paramount
in discussions and decisions about admissions to art schools, in art criticism,
and in decisions about funding and acquisition of works to collections. This is true for all art forms and in
professional and amateur contexts alike.
Assessed within this larger frame, there is circularity and limitations
to how well contextualist theory reflects practice.
exists yet another interpretation of the artworld that, on the face of
it, deals exactly with practices. This
is the sociologically inclined tradition inspired by Danto but developed by
George Dickie and others. Here,
the art world (or worlds) is understood as a set of institutions that organize
the production and reception of art. However,
this research does not look very much into what actually takes place in
individual and social processes of making and appreciating art.
linguistic turn in aesthetics meant a departure from essentialist definitions
and their alleged focus on the properties of a work of art towards the way we
speak about art, but not towards the practices whereby we engage with it. On the whole, it seems that contextualist
theory is unable to answer in a more holistic way questions about the role and
character of art in contemporary society.
Perhaps it does not aim to do so, its context being limited in advance. In a discussion about artification, this
limitation is a weakness since artification draws attention precisely to wider
contexts. My hunch is that a naturalist
theory can better account for present changes in the arts; at least it does not
prima facie deny the artistic
relevance of phenomena outside the established art world.
5. The naturalist perspective: art and non-art in
if art is not just a culturally contingent set of traditions but has a natural
basis as well? I am not claiming that it is only
natural; rather, I suggest that a contextualist and relativist understanding is
insufficient. I would now like to
suggest how naturalism can engage with practices that exist on the fringes of
established art institutions and what it means for our interpretation of
artification. But first I want to make
some additional theoretical points.
mentioned above, the naturalist approach is connected to a scientific and
broadly evolutionary worldview. Rather
than deciding in detail the contents of any theory, this is the frame within
which human culture, including art, is seen, much as a Christian worldview
framed classical German aesthetics. In
the naturalist perspective, the creation of art, not just culture in the broad
sense, is typical for human beings. Evolutionary
naturalism argues that aesthetic and artistic, or proto-artistic, activities
added to the chances of survival of individuals and groups, and the existence
of art in all human cultures is therefore no coincidence. This
argument about the centrality of art in human life does not implicate reductionism. Aesthetic inquiry becomes reductionist
only when experimental research or evolutionary hypotheses are presented as all
that can and needs to be said about the topic.
In any naturalist or evolutionary theory of art worthy
of that name, art itself must hold the center stage.
Broad naturalism, or “naturalism of second nature,”
is congruent with the views of thinkers such as John Dewey and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty. Neither considered nature
as opposed to humankind or culture, and both emphasized the continuity between
life and mind, psychology and philosophy, and pleasure and value.
As for Wittgenstein, his emphasis on the difference between natural science, on
the one hand, and philosophy, morality, and the arts, on the other, seemingly
makes it difficult to connect him to naturalism. Yet he is also an important resource in any
effort to naturalize art without reducing its meaning and complexity. Wittgenstein showed how grasping the meaning
and nuances of art involves a tacit knowing that we grow into through
participating in a culture. In this understanding, art and the aesthetic are areas where many things are
shared and pointed to through language, but essential qualities and meanings
escape prosaic formulation.
naturalist approach gives equal attention to artistic activities and works of art, and it starts by
looking at art in the contexts of human life rather
than within an art world that is separate from the everyday life-world. Contemporary naturalist theories also emphasize the difference between
the arts in different cultures. The main
idea is that art exists in all cultures, not that it is always of a particular
form. Dutton gave a list of twelve criteria
that, taken together, indicate that something is art or close to art.
Some of these are qualities of works,
whether physical pieces or performances; some characterize the reception of art
(criticism, traditions, and institutions); others indicate the possibility of a
particular kind of experience that is pleasurable and imaginative and holds
intellectual challenge. Dissanayake emphasized
the emotional, social, and transcendental functions of art.
Contemporary naturalist theories of art
thus emphasize rather than downplay art’s reflective, existential, and social
A major asset of naturalism is that it enables us to handle the question
of whether something is art in a non-exclusive way. Instead of a separating borderline
between art and non-art, it establishes a border area that is open on each side
and mediates the relationship between things that are clearly art and those
that are clearly not art. It allows the
existence of a large group of phenomena with art-typical properties and non-art
properties. In a naturalist perspective,
the phenomena of artification belong primarily in this borderland.
me now briefly sketch how naturalism might deal with some areas of artification,
starting with tendencies in contemporary art and then moving to areas that are
primarily not art but where art has been introduced either in the form of
practices or as a concept. As these
areas are primarily about bringing art into social contexts or transforming
processes through art, my emphasis will be on the quality of engagement and the
level of participation rather than on properties of art objects. This emphasis on embeddedness and
relationships, whether of art to contexts or of audiences and artists to art,
is in line with Wittgenstein’s idea that forms of expression are intrinsically
linked with life-forms, with specific cultural contexts.
is a wide range of phenomena and practices of art in the present, ranging from
traditional art forms, such as the novel, oil painting, and classical music, to
more recent and often performance- rather than object-centered art forms, such as
performance art, community art, or improvisation theater, to name just a few. The latter have challenged earlier views of
art in many ways. Activist, environmental, and community art have
extended the domain of art by introducing art in non-art contexts and merging
it with activities that are not art. What
has been radical is not the conquering of new physical spaces so much as the
way art has touched upon everyday life and work. In dialogical or relational art, the artist
may invite the audience into a process where the responsibility and authorship
of the work is shared, one consequence being
that the work is more of a process, performance, or duration than a fixed
object. Art may take on a political role
in new ways and also operate from within the institutional spaces of politics. In a discussion of artification, it is important to remember that these
tendencies have evolved over time and from within the art world, already beginning
in the avant-garde of the early twentieth century.
Probably because of this their status as
art, although discussed and seen by some as problematic, has not been seriously
challenged by theorists.
education, in many of its present forms, comes close to process-oriented or
relational art. Today art education comprises
not just educating people into practicing the arts or appreciating art but also
the use of artistic or arts-based methods in various contexts of education,
social work, healthcare, or business, sometimes but not always with predefined
therapeutic or educational goals and often not only with people who are
socially marginalized or have special needs. Artists are often involved in these projects but
similar methods are used by persons who are not professional artists. Whenever we speak about art education, it
seems evident that the object of that activity is art, whether the activity is teaching
appreciation or making art. This leaves
open the question how valuable it is as art.
Here we can note that, since the naturalist cluster criteria of art are
evaluative, naturalism brings back normativity and aesthetics into the center
of art theory. Similar criteria can be
used in discussing how to look at and analyze instances of artification. The procedure would be to start by looking
closely at the phenomenon: what it is and how it functions in its context, and
then reflect upon whether it is a weak or strong case of art or perhaps not art
looking more closely at some cases, it should be noted that institutional criteria
no longer apply. First, the question of
whether the maker of art is a professional or an amateur is not relevant. Art can be made by people who have not been
part of the publicly recognized art worlds, such as theaters, the film
industry, music production, or art schools.
On the other hand, naturalism emphasizes that art is a social,
historical, collective enterprise, and in this it differs from the romantic
idea of art as springing directly from the expressive needs of an individual. While naturalism broadens the sphere of
art-making outside a circle of professionals, it does not suggest that anyone
can become an artist instantly, without some training and context. Yet if humans have an inclination to make art, we can expect
that it evolves in different places and various ways, including outside the
institutional art worlds.
care and social work are areas where several art projects have been launched in
the Nordic countries in recent decades. Art
and culture are believed to have good effects on well-being and empowerment,
and there is research to support this. The best way to understand the potential of
art in such contexts might be to highlight individual projects. The Finnish actor Jussi Lehtonen toured with
a play based on Shakespeare’s sonnets of love to social and healthcare
institutions during 2006–2010. The reception was mostly warm, the
identification strong, and the response direct even when some of the audience
did not understand the play. This indicates
that the capacity to communicate through art, to share feelings, and to respond
is partly independent of our rational capacities, which is what naturalism
would suggest. The universal and recognizable
theme of love made it easy to relate to the play, which met the existential
challenge of dealing with central human themes. In addition, the performance was a means for
some members of the audience to reactivate their earlier relationship to art.
is a wealth of other projects introducing art in healthcare institutions, from
concerts to story-crafting and hospital clowns.
Qualities that seem to be present in such situations include the sharing
and articulation of feeling (individual or collective); possibilities of
individual expression, recognition, and achievement; imaginative experience;
and even transcendence. It is useful to
remember that for the most part we do not know what goes on in the audience’s
mind. However, the naturalist
recognition of proto-aesthetic and -artistic agency in early childhood, and the
claim that art is deeply embedded in our mental structure gives more weight to
such experiences than an intellectual understanding of art which assumes that
the route to art necessarily passes through theory.
educational contexts, such as schools and museums, art may be introduced for
its own sake to give people access to art but also in order to increase social
well-being or improve learning. It
seems that when the instrumental function becomes dominant, there is a risk
that the artistic part diminishes. This
may not be intentional. Rather, it might
be caused by streamlining the arts-based methods with the result that they can no
longer fully address the individual and contextual complexity of a situation. The more fixed the method is, the less it
gives room for participating individuals to influence and actively form what
takes place. Although the uses of art
are manifold, its potential in institutional settings seems to be linked to its
very strangeness, the fact that it represents a different way of thinking and
being as compared to the ordinary. In
addition, the duration and continuity of projects are also important, as
reflective and creative engagement takes time to develop.
The audiences of art have not been much discussed by art theory. Yet the ultimate reason why art institutions
exist in contemporary society is that people enjoy art: they visit
exhibitions, buy books, go to the cinema, and dwell on their experiences. This fundamental human interest in the arts
gives private and public funders reason to support the arts. Art is not maintained arbitrarily; there are active
art audiences with appreciative skills. One consequence of the cross-over from art to non-art
contexts is that the audience increasingly encounters works that are made by
artists but do not wear the label art. This
may lower the threshold for considering works that do not come from the art
world to be art. The naturalist
perspective permits us to think that in encountering an arresting piece of
graffiti or a virtuoso storyteller, we may legitimately recognize this as an
instance of art, or almost art, as a skillful, imaginatively rich achievement that
calls for a reflective response that may be rewarding. In pondering whether something is art, we
usually do not invoke theories of the art world; rather, we recall our previous experiences of art and dwell on
the aesthetic qualities of the object. Such
a response may arise in any context, and the outcome can be positive or
negative. In either case, we rely on aesthetic
judgment and argument that are informed by a socially and pragmatically constituted
understanding of art rather than just a discursive one. For naturalism, the difference between seeing something as art and
giving it the status of art is not crucial.
If an artifact is worth seeing as art, then we may have good reason to
say that it is art.
intention in the foregoing has not been to deny that artification, or the open
borderland between art and non-art, can be problematic for art. Applying the term ‘art’ without caution can
backfire on art by suggesting that it is everywhere and something anyone can do. This is not the naturalist view. In addition, art is sometimes introduced in
inappropriate contexts or for inappropriate reasons, as when a company planning
to fire part of the staff invites an improvisation theater group in order to
make things more pleasant. This is worlds apart from the potentially
positive effects of long-term engagement with the arts for fostering creative
thinking in business or science. In addition to its obvious unethical
character, the problem with the example is that the project remained separate,
even positively irrelevant to its context, disconnected in a way that would
rather hinder engagement and experience.
The question of whether we should call something art is, however, also
political. Often to grant a piece the status of art or a
person the status of artist is to increase their cultural standing. On the other hand, the reasons to keep the
gates of the art world shut do not always stem from a concern for quality; they
may also arise from a concern about prestige and money.
Naturalism does not offer a univocal
answer to what 'artification' means. It
suggests that, among the phenomena covered by this term, some may indeed be cases
of calling non-art art. In other cases,
introducing art may lead to a situation where it takes hold and starts to grow. This does not transform a non-art practice into
art but it may secure a space for art or something art-like within that
practice. In a third group of cases,
there might be recognition that art of some kind is already in place. Naturalism suggests that, however we want to
see these cases, they are about more than a change of terminology. The understanding of what art is may always be in a state of change if
novelty and creativity are among its central features.
The fear that art dissolves into the everyday is unfounded from a naturalist
understanding, since its starting point is that the specificity of art is a
given, although at the same time relative to culture. Art is not independent of economic pressure,
political decisions, social structures and educational resources, but it is
resistant to them.
Pauline von Bonsdorff
von Bonsdorff is Professor of Art Education at the University
of Jyväskylä, Finland and docent (Adjunct
Professor) of Aesthetics at the University of Helsinki, Finland. A large part of her earlier research is in environmental
aesthetics; currently her most eager explorations take place in the
intersections of childhood, aesthetics, and art.
Published on April 5, 2012.
 A first version of this paper was presented in the
Philosophy seminar at the NUI Galway in September 2011. I thank participants of the seminar and
especially Paul Crowther for comments and suggestions, and the Academy of Finland for a two-month grant that
helped me to focus on this research.
 Wolfgang Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics, trans. Andrew Inkpin (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 7-8. German
original: Grenzgänge der Ästhetik
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996); pp. 20-21.
 On the recognition of art, see Denis Dutton, “A
Naturalist Definition of Art,” Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 64, 3 (2006), 367-377; ref. on 368 and passim.
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische
Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and
Joachim Schulte; revised fourth edition by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Malden,
Oxford and Chichester:
Wiley Blackwell, 2009); ref. I § 38. References are henceforth given with the
abbreviation PI and paragraph. I used
the German original but made comparisons to the English translation when
 See, for example, Larry Shiner, The
Invention of Art: A Cultural History (Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 2001).
notion was coined by P. O. Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the
History of Aesthetics,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 12 (1951), 496-527
and 13 (1952), 17-46.
 Shiner, Invention,
11. The “artist” is one example of an underlying idea.
 Tom Sandqvist, Ett
svunnet Europa: Om modernismens glömda rötter [A lost Europe: On the forgotten roots of Modernism]; (Stockholm: Symposion, 2009).
 Not all of them
are theories in any
strong sense of the term, but they do suggest what the key characteristics of
art are and what distinguishes art from non-art. For
a discussion of the status of aesthetic theory and an analysis of the debate,
see B. R. Tilghman, But is it Art?: The Value of Art and the Temptation of Theory (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell,1984), ref. chapters 1 and 2.
 They are, in other words, different ways of ordering the world. See Michel
Foucault, Les mots et les choses: Une
archéologie des sciences humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 1966) and L’archéologie du savoir (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1969). As the
types I describe are ideal, actual theories can share features with more than
one type, and there is overlap in what they see as central to art.
 G. W. F. Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich
Nietzsche, Benetto Croce, R. G. Collingwood,
Clive Bell all belong in this group. Essentialism
is often taken to imply a belief in the unchanging
essence of phenomena such as woman, art, or nature. But essentialism need not imply this; see, for
example, Christine Battersby, The
Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Pattern of
Identity (London: Polity Press and New York:
 As George
Dickie observed, the classificatory sense of ‘art’ is different from the
evaluative one. For an update of
Dickie’s theory, see “The Institutional Theory of Art,” in Noël Carroll, ed., Theories of Art Today (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press
2000), pp. 93-108, ref. p. 97.
 In this group we find David Hume, Yrjö Hirn, John
Dewey, Ellen Dissanayake, Denis Dutton and others. For the relevance of infant research, see
Steven Malloch and Colwyn Trevarthen, eds., Communicative
Musicality: Exploring the Basis of Human
Oxford University Press, 2009).
 See, for example, Denis Dutton, “But They Don’t Have
Our Concept of Art,” in Noël Carroll, ed., Theories
of Art Today (Madison:
The University of Wisconsin Press 2000), pp.
 See Dutton, “Naturalist Definition,” pp. 375-376.
 I do not suggest that these are opposed. In fact, I believe art characteristically
involves producing a work, only such works need not have tangible, static form;
see Pauline von Bonsdorff, “Aesthetics and Bildung,”
forthcoming in Diogenes; or, on “aesthetic
agency,” “Aesthetics of childhood – phenomenology and beyond,” Fabian Dorsch,
ed., Proceedings of the European Society
for Aesthetics, 1 (2009), http://proceedings.eurosa.org/?p=12.
 This is even somewhat paradoxical, given the
widespread awareness that
aesthetic and artistic properties emerge only when works of art are perceived.
 There are exceptions, such as Tilghman, But Is It Art?; or Simo Säätelä, Aesthetics as Grammar: Wittgenstein and
Post-Analytic Philosophy of Art (Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of
 PI I, pp. 3-4
and § 18.
 This is closely related to our “perceptual faith” in
the world of perception. See Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la
perception (Paris: Gallimard,1992/1945), pp. 343-4; and similar ideas in
Wittgenstein; PI I, § 575.
 Wittgenstein points to the intimate connection
between names and faces, or between reading a word and hearing its sound to
oneself, PI I, § 171.
 The German expression is “klangliche Gebärde,” PI I, § 527 passim. Such gestures foreground
the aesthetic and affective dimension of language.
 When children play there is often no aim of winning
(although power may be negotiated), even no pre-articulated aim at all, only a
decision to play, and perhaps a theme. For
a more developed comparison of children’s play and art, see my “Play as Art and
Communication: Gadamer and Beyond,” in Seppo Knuuttila, Erkki Sevänen and Risto
Turunen, eds., Aesthetic Culture (Helsinki: Maahenki, 2005),
 PI I, § 206; also § 96.
 An expression favored by Wittgenstein. On the importance of participatory experience
for understanding, see Béla Szabados, “Wittgenstein the Musical: Notes toward
an Appreciation,” Canadian Aesthetics Journal, 10 (2004).
 PI I, § 340 “One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its application and learn from that.” In § 358 Wittgenstein
is at a loss over the senselessness of private intentions while recognizing them
as “a dream of our language.”
 Painting is mentioned by Wittgenstein in PI II, §168. On music, see Szabados, “Wittgenstein.”
 Artistic research has challenged this view but has
not yet really affected the debate about the definition of art.
 For an overview, see Noël Carroll, “Introduction,” Theories of Art Today, pp. 3-24: ref. pp.
3-15 or Tilghman, But Is It Art?, pp. 46-63.
 Danto invented the artworld as a response to an
exhibition with works by Andy Warhol in the Stable Gallery in New York in 1964, where Warhol showed works
that were virtually indistinguishable from their real, non-art counterparts. Danto
surmised that what distinguished art were not any perceivable features, but
being part of the artworld. See Arthur C. Danto, ”The artworld,” The Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964), 571-584; The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace. A
Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
 Danto, Transfiguration,
 Tilghman, But
Is It Art? p. 63.
 Danto, Transfiguration,
 Particularly in the philosophy of art the same or
similar examples, such as Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain
and Andy Warhol’s Brillo boxes, tend
to be used again and again. Danto
himself cannot be accused of not knowing the artworld that he writes about,
which is that of New York.
 Danto, Transfiguration, chapter 4. In his later work Danto has mentioned the
possibility that aesthetics plays a role after all, but he does not specify how
this affects his earlier view, and he still contends that in “the present
period” “nothing that meets the eye reveals the difference” between art and
non-art. The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics
and the Concept of Art (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2003), p. 17.
 Similar problems are attached to Jerrold Levinson’s
more recent historicist theory, see “Defining Art Historically,” British Journal of Aesthetics 19 (1979), 232-250; “Refining Art Historically,” The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47 (1989), 21-33; “Extending
Art Historically,” The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (1993), 411-423; and Contemplating
Art: Essays in Aesthetics
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 13-26.
 See for example George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1974). Howard Becker
adopted the concept art world but started to use it, wisely, in the plural; Art Worlds
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
 See especially Denis Dutton, The Art Instinct: Beauty,
Pleasure, and Human Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); also Ellen
Dissanayake, What is Art For?
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988) and Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes from and Why (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1992).
 Reductionist naturalism
tends to explain away the aesthetic altogether.
As Sami Pihlström points out, one problem is that it conceives “of nature simply as the realm of natural
law and seek[s] to reduce human beings’ conceptual powers…to this realm.” Naturalizing
the Transcendental: A Pragmatic View (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2003), p. 206. Reductionist naturalism is more common in
discussions about beauty and aesthetic values than with art; see, for example, Nancy Etcoff, The
Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty (New York: Doubleday,
1999). Also Jay Appleton’s approach to
landscape verges on reductionism.
See The Experience of Landscape (New York:
Wiley, 1975). In his discussion of
aesthetic naturalism, Lev Kreft warns against the ideological normativity of
“Nature” in twentieth century ideology and argues that naturalism often misses
the point of contemporary art; “The Second Modernity of Naturalist Aesthetics,”
Filozofski vestnik, 28, 2 (2007), 83-98. This is not, however, a necessary
consequence of naturalism.
 For a discussion, see Denis Dutton, “Aesthetics and
Evolutionary Psychology,” The Oxford
Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold
Levinson (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003), pp. 693-705; or Ellen
Dissanayake, Art and Intimacy: How the
Arts Began (Seattle and London: The University of Washington Press,
2000), ref. pp. 205-225.
Naturalizing, pp. 206-208.
 John Dewey, Art
as Experience, (New York: Perigree Books, 1980/1934); Maurice Merleau-Ponty 2001.
Psychologie et pédogogie de l’enfant: Cours de Sorbonne
1949 – 1952 (Paris:
Verdier, 1993/1964); ”Le langage indirect et les voix du silence,” in Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1996/1960), pp. 49–104 ; L’oeil et l’esprit (Paris: Gallimard 1993/1964); “Le doute de Cézanne,” in Sens et non-sens
(Paris: Nagel, 1966), pp. 15–44.
 The term “tacit” is meant to underline the fact that
appreciating art is an educational, long-term process.
 Dutton, Art
Instinct, 2009, pp. 52-59.
 Dissanayake, Homo Aestheticus and Art and Intimacy, pp. 205-225.
Dissanayake’s theory is more morally normative, as it claims that art
should deal with issues that are central in life, whereas Dutton’s list is
aesthetically but not ethically normative.
 See for example Art
and Social Change: A Critical Reader, eds. Will Bradley and Charles Esche (London: Tate Publishing,
2007). For discussions of more recent
developments, see Shiner, pp. 289-307;
Suzi Gablik, The Reenchantment of Art
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1993/1991); Nicolas Bourriaud, Esthétique relationelle (Paris: Les presses du reel, 2001); Grant H. Kester, Conversation Pieces: Community and Communication in Modern Art (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:
University of California Press, 2004); Artistic Citizenship: A Public Voice for the Arts, eds. Mary
Schmidt Campbell and Randy Martin (New
York and Oxon: Routledge, 2006). Recent examples of public, (anti-)monumental
art address politics and history in new ways.
See, for example, the projects of Jochen Gerz: http://www.gerz.fr.
 Bourriaud is interesting precisely because he
highlights the artistic, aesthetic and formal features of relational art.
 I have learned significantly about what goes on in
such processes from graduate and post-graduate students of art education at the
University of Jyväskylä, whom I hereby thank collectively.
 The main point
of Yves Michaud’s
criticism of relationality in art is that the aesthetic threatens to take over;
Yves Michaux, L’Art à l’état gazeux: Essai sur le triomphe de l’esthétique, (Paris: Hachette, 2003).
 Anne Bamford, The WOW Factor:
Global Research Compendium on the Impact of the Arts
(Münster: Waxmann, 2006); James S. Catterall, Doing Well and Doing Good by Doing Art (Los
Angeles and London:
Imagination Group, 2009).
 The institutions included hospitals, prisons, mental
health institutions, homes for elderly, and schools. Jussi Lehtonen, Samassa valossa. Näyttelijäntyö
hoitolaitoskiertueella [In the same light: the actor’s work on a tour to
Avain, 2010). More projects are
described in Taide keskellä elämää
[Art in the midst of life], eds. Marjatta Bardy et. al. (Helsinki:
 Dissanayake, Homo
 See Bamford, Wow
 Compare Dutton, “Naturalist Definition.”
This example comes from Valpuri Tauriainen, Taiteesta
työhyvinvointia? Improvisaatio- ja vuorovaikutuskoulutukset työyhteisöissä [Well-being at work through art? Improvisation
and interaction courses in work communities], (MA thesis, University of
Jyväskylä, 2011), https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/handle/123456789/36912.
 David Edwards, Artscience:
Creativity in the Post-Google Generation (Cambridge: Harvard University
 For a critique of the art world on these lines, see Robert C. Morgan, The
End of the Art World (New York: Allworth Press, 1998).
 This view is shared by Dutton (see “But They Don’t”; “Naturalist
Definition”; Art Instinct) and the
modern fine arts system.