In 1901, Chogyu Takayama (1871-1902),
philosopher and literary critic, published a short article entitled “On the
Aesthetic Life.” Takayama’s article, regarded as a manifesto of Nietzscheism by
his contemporaries, triggered a great debate among a great many literary
critics, including Shoyo Tsubouchi and Ogai Mori. This paper argues that
Takayama’s article constituted a framework for aesthetic thought in modern
Japan and marked the Japanization of Western modern aesthetics. Takayama was
not interested in the modern Western idea of autonomous art; instead, he tried
to work out the aesthetic in one’s way of living. What underlies Takayama’s
idea of the aesthetic life is, to my mind, a traditional Japanese view of art
according to which beauty is to be sought inside the world, not beyond the
world. In other words, the idea of the aesthetic was decontextualized from its
Western context of autonomous art and recontextualized within the traditional
concept of the art of living. This is why his idea of the aesthetic life caused
a profound echo and became a keynote in twentieth-century Japanese aesthetics.
aesthetic life; art of living; the
cognitive/the moral/the aesthetic; art of being in the world; everyday object; gei-do
(the way of art); the absolute in the relative; habit; teaism
Recently, Richard Shusterman (1949- ),
an American pragmatist philosopher, recalled the ancient idea of philosophy as
“an art of living,” thereby following Deweyan pragmatism and aiming at
overcoming “art’s modern specialization,” that is, the dichotomy between art
and life, and “recovering the continuity of aesthetic experience with the
normal process of living.” Seen from this perspective, aesthetic
thought in modern Japan has a striking characteristic or tendency of denying
any dichotomy between art and life. In this paper, I will argue that the idea
of the aesthetic life has constituted a leitmotif of modern Japanese
The idea of the aesthetic life is not
foreign to Western thought. Already in 1747, under the decisive influence of
Alexander Baumgarten (1714-62), the founder of modern aesthetics, Georg
Friedrich Meier (1718-77) introduced the concept “aesthetic life of cognition”
(das ästhetische Leben der Erkenntnis, vita cognitionis aesthetica) that
he held as the “utmost beauty” of cognition. Since then, the aesthetic life, or to
live aesthetically, has been addressed by several thinkers, including Friedrich
Schiller (1759-1805) and Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55). Until recently, however, few studies
have historically and analytically elucidated the concept of the aesthetic
Aesthetics, in the modern sense of the
term, was introduced, or transplanted, into Japan in the late nineteenth
century as part of modernization or Westernization. At the turn of the century,
however, aesthetics as a discipline took root in the Japanese intellectual
world, which can be symbolized by the debate on the aesthetic life that began
in 1901 and continued to 1903.
In 1901, Chogyu Takayama (1871-1902),
philosopher and literary critic, published a short but thought-provoking
article entitled “On the Aesthetic Life” in Taiyo (Sun), the magazine he
edited. His article triggered debate, one of the first great debates in the
field of aesthetics on the meaning of the aesthetic life (biteki seikatsu),
among a great many literary critics, including Shoyo Tsubouchi (1859-1935) and
Ogai Mori (1862-1922). Takayama’s article, which his contemporaries regarded as
a Nietzschean manifesto, has usually been studied either in relation to
Takayama’s late position advocating individualism and instinctivism or in the
context of how Nietzsche was received in modern Japan. When viewed from either perspective,
however, the most important aspects of Takayama’s article remained unnoticed.
In what follows, I argue that Takayama’s article constituted a framework for
aesthetic thought in modern Japan and marked the Japanization of Western modern
Takayama was not an advocate for the modern
Western idea of autonomous art; he instead tried to incorporate the aesthetic
into an individual’s way of living. What underlies Takayama’s idea of the
aesthetic life is a traditional Japanese view of art (gei or gei-do)
according to which beauty is to be sought in the world, not beyond it. That is,
the idea of the aesthetic was decontextualized from its Western context of
autonomous art and recontextualized within the traditional conception of the
art of living. This is why his idea caused a profound echo and became a keynote
in twentieth-century Japanese aesthetics.
2. A theoretical reconstruction of
In the beginning of his article,
Takayama provisionally defines the aesthetic life as “what serves life and body
that are superior to bread and clothes.” His definition is somewhat abstract
and vague. We have to theoretically reconstruct his argument to understand its
specific content. Takayama uses the word ‘aesthetic’ in contrast to the words
‘cognitive’ and ‘moral.’ This word choice shows his being
influenced by neo-Kantian philosophy.
Takayama reasons that “it is
impossible to find a safe haven in morality and cognition.” That is, neither cognition nor
morality can attain something absolute because cognition is a step-by-step
process of questions and answers and morality is inseparable from effort and,
for this reason, presupposes something immoral that must be overcome by effort.
Takayama, however, continues: “The ideal of morality must be established
without effort. … Being brought onto this stage, morality is nothing other than
amorality. It is beyond consciousness, beyond reflection and beyond effort. It
is a type of habit or instinct.” Takayama's examples of “following
one’s heart without going beyond the bounds” and of “the singing birds” or “the
flowers of the field” show that he takes the position of moral intuitionism or
sentimentalism, according to which the true good consists not in unceasing
effort but is something immediately perceived and practiced. He calls the power that immediately
perceives and practices the good “instinct,” thereby equating instinct with
habit, as second nature, which indicates his position cannot be reduced to a
category of instinctivism, as is usually seen in the secondary literature.
Instinct, in Takayama’s sense, is not innate but rather what was gained through
human history and handed down to future generations. Further, Takayama
characterizes instinct or habit as amoral because it is beyond moral
consciousness. Such amorality that lies beyond good and evil is to be
distinguished from immorality, which is still bound by the dichotomy between
good and evil.
Takayama’s position is not isolated.
He shares the same interest with the post-Kantians who were concerned with
overcoming Kantian dualism: Schiller, for example, by means of aesthetic
education, and Schelling, by means of aesthetic intuition. Between 1790, when Kant’s
Critique of the Power of Judgment was published, and 1800, when
Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism was published, the
aesthetic or aesthetics became a watchword for the post-Kantians. It is no
wonder, then, that Takayama characterizes his position aesthetic.
Takayama thus opposes the cognitive
and moral life to the aesthetic life, arguing that “the moral and the cognitive
life have only relative value in their nature, whereas the aesthetic life has
in itself an absolute value, in that it satisfies the desire of human nature.” That is, “the value of the aesthetic
life is absolute or intrinsic.” Both the moral life and the cognitive
life are opposed to the aesthetic life as the relative, or extrinsic, to the
absolute, or intrinsic. What Takayama understands under the rubric of the
aesthetic life remains unclear. He does not unambiguously state how the
absolute value is possible or what the desire of human nature or instinct
In the following section, however,
Takayama clarifies his argument. He continues: “However, even what is not
instinct cannot be hindered from being aesthetic, as far as its value can be
regarded as absolute. Thus the realm of the aesthetic life can be extended to
more than what satisfies instinct.” It follows that Takayama’s position
cannot be subsumed into instinctivism. As examples of the aesthetic life, in
the broad sense of the term, Takayama enumerates six realms: morality,
cognition, money, love, yoga, and art. We consider morality, the cognitive
life, and the aesthetic.
First, morality has only a relative
value but, if “one considers it to have an absolute value and finds the final
end of life in performing morality,” one’s action is no longer moral but
aesthetic, as is seen in the situation of loyal retainers, devoted sons, or
valiant heroines. Such an idea of aesthetic action
reminds us of Schiller’s critique against Kant. By reintegrating freedom into
beauty and duty into inclination, Schiller tries to transcend Kantian dualism.
Second, the cognitive life can be also
regarded as aesthetic, as far as the pursuit of truth becomes autotelic.
Certainly, true scholars would disagree with such autotelism of cognition but
it provides “a satisfaction that true scholars cannot acquire.”
Finally, Takayama refers to “the poets
and artists who sacrificed themselves for what pleased them.” For Takayama,
being aesthetic and being artistic are independent of each other and art is in
itself only a means to some end. “Art for life’s sake,” or even “art for
instinct’s sake,” might be his motto. Some artists, however, devote their lives
to the ideal of their art. “After all, art is their life, their ideal.”
These examples demonstrate that while
in Section 6 Takayama dualistically opposes the moral and the cognitive life as
something relative to the aesthetic life as something absolute, in Section 7 he
relativizes his dualism between the relative and the absolute, thereby finding
the possibility of the relative’s being treated as absolute or aesthetic.
I next address the three key points
from Takayama’s article, and show them anticipating aesthetic thought in the
first half of twentieth century Japan.
3. On the view of art implied in the
idea of the aesthetic life
The first point to notice is that
Takayama relates the adjective ‘aesthetic’ to ‘life’ without limitation. This
relation is not at all self-evident. The underlying idea is to seek the
aesthetic or beauty not beyond life but within life. Such an attitude toward
the aesthetic originates from a traditional Japanese view of art that is
different from the Western modern view of art, for example, art for its own
Here we focus on The Book of Tea
(1906), written in English by Kakuzo (Tenshin) Okakura (1862-1913). In this
book, Okakura addresses Teaism (Chado in Japanese, literally, the way of
tea), explaining the Eastern view of art or, rather, worldview. Okakura asserts
that “the chief contribution of Taoism to Asiatic life has been in the realm of
aesthetics,” seeking the essence of Taoism in the “art of being in the world,”
the “art of life,” or the “art of living” and thereby characterizing teaism. The art of being in the world is in
refining the ordinary act of drinking tea into an artistic form. Arthur Danto
would find here a kind of “transfiguration of the commonplace” that is not
guaranteed institutionally by the artworld of or concerning teaism (that is,
tea-world) but rather is practiced by everyday aesthetic living. It must be noticed here that Okakura
legitimizes the mundane as a root of teaism, or rather Asian art in general,
which underlies subsequent aesthetic thought in twentieth-century Japan.
Handicraft, along with teaism, closely
relates to the mundane. In this context, we have to consider Muneyoshi (Soetsu)
Yanagi’s idea of folk art or, in his words, “folk craft” (Mingei). In his lecture entitled “Beauty and
Life” (1931), Yanagi (1889-1961) notes that beauty in the modern era is
regarded as “something lofty” and that a “lofty beauty” is sought in “what is
far from life and not related directly to life,” arguing that “not artworks, but
craftworks closely connect beauty with life.” Yanagi further concentrates on
teaism, whose significance Yanagi claims lies in “finding the standard of
beauty in everyday objects,"
saying that “the tea masters had the deepest opinions and experiences concerning
the relationship between beauty and life.” In conclusion, Yanagi postulates that
“the everyday object is most important for the aesthetic life and morality of
human being.” The aesthetic life is not opposed to
morality, as was Takayama's perspective, but constitutes the humanity of human
In the 1930s, Tsuneyoshi Tsuzumi
(1887-1981) formulates the idea of art not being separate from life as the
“framelessness between art and life.” Tsuzumi, who is now quite forgotten
even in Japan, was probably the first Japanese to lecture and publish books on Japanese aesthetics in Germany, in German. Inspired by Georg Simmel’s essay
“Picture Frame: An Aesthetic Essay” (1902), Tsuzumi becomes conscious of
Eastern, especially traditional Japanese, painting lacking a frame, drawing
from it a general tendency of the Eastern view of art or, rather, worldview:
framelessness or, in German, Rahmenlosigkeit, an expression he coined.
The framelessness in Tsuzumi's systematic theory of Japanese culture is
threefold: 1) between nature and human beings (object and subject), 2) between artworks and the
outer world, or between art and life, and 3) between individual art genres. What is at issue
in our context is the second framelessness that pertains to art as not a
specific aesthetic phenomenon but a way of life related to cultivation. Tsuzumi further
reasons that such “artification (or aestheticization) of life” is especially
exemplified by craft. In his later
book entitled A Research into Artistic Japan (1941), Tsuzumi notes the
Japanese view of art that does not draw a line between art and life originates
from the aesthetic life in the Heian period [794-1185]. Tsuzumi’s thesis
concerning the framelessness between art and life culminates aesthetic thought
in Japan originating from Takayama’s thought-provoking idea of the aesthetic
4. On the
absolute in the relative
The second point
in Takayama’s article is that he not only proposes but also relativizes the dualism of the relative and the
absolute. Here we begin by considering Okakura’s The Book of Tea (1906),
as we did in the previous section. For Taoism, Okakura writes that “Its (=
Tao’s) Absolute is the Relative,” explaining thereby as follows: “The Present
is the moving Infinity, the legitimate sphere of the Relative. Relativity seeks
Adjustment; Adjustment is Art. The art of life lies in a constant readjustment
to our surroundings.” That is, the absolute of Taoism is
not beyond this world because, apart from the relative relationships of the
finites to each other, an absolute cannot exist. What is at issue is to adjust
the finites within this world so that they may co-exist with each other, which
Okakura calls the “art of life” or the “art of being in the world.” Therefore,
the absolute must be sought in our art of life, which is the underlying idea of
teaism: “The whole ideal of Teaism is a result of this Zen conception of
greatness in the smallest incidents of life. Taoism furnished the basis for aesthetic
ideals, Zennism made them practical.”
Motomori Kimura (1895-1946) most
clearly formulates the idea of seeking the absolute within the finite. In the
following, I will reconstruct his aesthetic theory based on his early article
entitled “The idea of artistic beauty in Hegel” (1931).
Kimura characterizes artistic creation
as follows: “No one recognizes miscalculation and bad actions as having
positive values by themselves. The situation is not the same, however,
with beauty.” If “a painted form is amended” by the painter him- or herself,
“between these two pictures there is, on one side, certain progress concerning
aesthetic expression and artistic value; on the other side, each picture has by
and in itself a peculiar and unchangeable value.” This means that each stage of
artistic creation simultaneously has a relative value aiming at completion and
an irreplaceable or incommensurable value. A sketch for a work, for example,
can be appreciated as a preliminary step and as an end for itself. This duality
underlies artistic creation: “The essence of creation or the nature of a work
lies in seeking completion in infinite distance and being completed in
each finite instance... . What is far away reveals itself in each instance of
presence, this is expression, this is the birth of a work.” Kimura who began his career studying
the philosophy of German idealism, especially Fichte, presupposes once a
Kant-Fichtean position of Sollen, seeking at the same time to transcend it,
which Kimura claims is possible in artistic creation because artistic creation
is, from one perspective, based on the Kant-Fichtean position, in that it
always denies the status quo and aims at a more perfect future. From another
perspective, artistic creation is not a future-oriented process, in that each
state has its own undeniable value. Here we find a legitimate echo of the
thinking of post-Kantians, especially Schiller and Schelling.
In his article entitled “A Blow of
Chisel” (1933), a manifesto of his own aesthetic theory, Kimura writes: “A
finite blow of the chisel is immediately an expression of the infinite. That
is, it is filled and saturated with the infinite”; or even, alluding to the Nirvana
Sutra, “In a blow of the chisel is practiced the principle that all beings
have the Buddha-Nature.” Kimura’s aesthetic thinking certainly
has a nirvanic background. What does not follow, however, is that Kimura relies
only on nirvanic Buddhism. Rather, his confrontation with modern Western
thinking, especially German idealism, developed his awareness of Buddhist
tradition, reinterpreting and transforming anew its original meaning in light
of aesthetic thinking.
5. On habit as second nature
As we have seen in Section 2,
Takayama’s theory of the aesthetic life, which has often been considered as
fostering instinctivism, cannot be reduced to it. Neither does what he calls
instinct mean something innate and animalistic. Rather, it is habit as second
nature, that is, what was gained through human history and is passed to future
generations. In this section, we focus on the idea of habit, showing how
Takayama’s idea of instinct as habit, or second nature, was further addressed
in the aesthetic thinking during the first half of the last century.
First, we turn to Motomori Kimura’s
theory. In the 1930s, Kimura considers the meaning of body, addressing the
polysemy of the Japanese term mi, as follows: “The term mi does
have the meaning of body as a natural object, but it also has the meaning of
self as is expressed in the phrase ‘mi wo omou’ (taking care of
oneself), and even that of heart as seen in the phrase ‘mi wo tsukusu’
(devoting one’s energies). Thus, the human body is dialectic existence as
subject-object. As a subject making inroads into nature, it is an apical end of
the expressive will of a subject. Alternatively, as nature making inroads into
subject, it is a limitation of a subject by nature.” As is later the
case with Hiroshi Ichikawa (1931-2002) in his Structure of “Mi” (1984),
the polysemy of the word mi gives Kimura a clue to approach the
peculiarity of the human body, which Kimura argues is found in its mediating
between the inner and the outer, as is shown in the Japanese term te-gokoro
(literally, hand-heart). Te-gokoro means the “heart that dwells in hands
and works through hands.”
What is to be
noticed is that Kimura defined the actions of a heart residing in a body as
art, that is, technique. Art is a kind of somatic intellect that indwells in
hands, an intuitive knowledge that delicately works in accordance with objects.
Kimura notes that there are many “expressions related to body, in particular,
to hands (te)” that describe the “forms of art, ”for example, concerning
working ways of technique, te-ren (wiles), te-kuda (trick), te-giwa
(dexterity), and te-sabaki (manipulation); regarding technical
properties of an object as material, te-goro (handy) and te-gowai
(stiff); and with reference to the work of art as a synthesis of working and
material, te-no-konda (elaborate), te-garu-na (easygoing), and te-wo-nuita
(negligent). All these examples indicate that human beings have not only an
inner existence but also a somatic existence. Referring to
Ravaisson’s theory in his Of Habit (1838), Kimura explained the process
in which technique is gained as follows: “It is the will that first makes the
hands move. This process being repeated over and over, the hands gradually
become purposively habituated. Then we gain the heart residing in the hands.” Technique as the
“naturalized will that dwells in the body” is realized by habitual practice. That is, habit
takes the shape of technique and forms the core of a human being.
A theory of habit
as technique can be also found in Kiyoshi Miki (1897-1945), a contemporary of
Kimura. In his Logic of Imagination (vol. 3, 1939), one of his main
works, Miki examines technique as follows: “For homo faber, instruments are
‘unconscious projections’ of organs, that is, a continuation of body.” Technique seems
“closely adhered to our sensual experience” and, therefore, a natural phenomenon
for human beings. Miki argues,
however, that “an invention of instruments cannot be made by sensual
experience; it needs imagination.” Whereas our
sensual experience pertains only to individuals, an invention of instruments
presupposes not only sensual experience but also imagination, which Miki claims
is a faculty of using symbols in Cassirer’s sense. That means a
leap of imagination is needed for technology. At the same time, an invented
instrument must be used unconsciously, that is, must become a continuation of
body. Otherwise, the instrument would not be worthy of being called an
instrument. This is why instruments are closely adhered to our sensual
experience and become parts of our body through habit.
argues that such operation of technique does not belong exclusively to human
beings. “All living beings exist in an environment; by technically adjusting to
an environment, life produces form.” And, “in principle, human technique means
an adjustment between subject and environment.” Now, “the ground
of all technique is movements of our body, which has been, in turn, formed
technically [in the process of nature’s history].” We can say, therefore, that
“human technique continues nature’s technique.” It follows that
Miki’s theory of technique aims at “understanding in a unified way human
history and nature’s history.”
dwells in or inhabits the human body as habit in the sense of second nature
constitutes the basis of human beings for Kimura and Miki. This conception of technique
can be regarded as the offspring of Takayama’s idea of instinct as habit in his
article entitled “On the Aesthetic Life.”
then, is what the background of such conception of technique is. Neither Kimura
nor Miki clearly addresses this question. To my mind, a traditional Japanese
view of art (gei-do; literally, the way of art) is one of the factors
that enabled Kimura’s and Miki’s conception of technique.
Here is Muneyoshi
(Soetsu) Yanagi's theory of technique. In his essay entitled “The beauty of the
common object” (1926), which can be regarded as a manifesto of his Mingei
theory, he considers a craftsperson’s speed bulk manufacturing. Such
manufacturing seems to lead only to a kind of inertia. Yanagi, however, finds
something positive in a craftsperson’s repetition: “Repetition is the mother of
expertism... . Hands win the perfect freedom through this repetition.” “Hands winning
the perfect freedom” means that the craftsperson is no longer conscious of
technique. Chogu Takayama would regard this state as “beyond consciousness.” Yanagi
continues: “Those who perfectly master the technique are beyond consciousness
of the technique. They are far from contrivance and forget endeavor.” That is, habit
gained through repetition makes possible true freedom or creativity, which is
beyond consciousness. Such an idea is based on the traditional view of art.
Or we may refer
to Tsuneyoshi Tsuzumi, who explains the reason art was called the way of art in
Japan: “The ‘way’ means that we are not satisfied with mastering the technique
and that we regard it rather as a means of polishing the whole human being. The
therefore, is related to cultivation in the broad sense of the word; it is a way of life.” That is,
mastering a technique leads to cultivating the whole human being consisting of
mind and body. Cultivation pertains not only to our mind; it concerns the
body’s mastering the technique and aims at attaining a way of life. We could
even argue that our way of life is possible as a technique in the sense of
second nature. Seen from this perspective, we hear an echo of Kakuzo (Tenshin)
Okakura’s idea of art of living or art of life that underlies his theory of
then, is why we exercise or discipline ourselves to master a technique. An
exercise could certainly be, speaking with Foucault in his Discipline and
Punish, a discipline that produces docile bodies. In this situation, mind
controls body. An exercise, however, does not solely shape the body into
passivity. It could provide us with a heightened, sharpened, and more
sensitized, body. A heightened
body is then able to call creative acts from the subject or, rather, to
stimulate the subject to invent what it could not think of by its autonomous
mind, which testifies to the creativity of somatic exercise for human beings. This is why the
art of living or art of life can regenerate and innovate itself by the
interrelationship between mind and body.
In conclusion, the three key points
taken from Takayama’s article entitled “On the Aesthetic Life” constitute a
framework of aesthetic thought in modern Japan that, occasioned by the
encounter with modern European aesthetics, tried to complement European aesthetics
through reflecting on the traditional tacit view of art in Japan. The idea of
the aesthetic was decontextualized from its Western context of autonomous art
and recontextualized within the traditional conception of way of art. This is
also why the concept of the aesthetic life gained wide acceptance and
constituted a leitmotif in modern Japan.
Tanehisa Otabe is
Professor of Aesthetics at the University of Tokyo and the former President of
the Japanese Society for Aesthetics. He has academic interests in aesthetics in
Germany in the eighteenth century and intercultural aesthetics.
Published on March 13, 2018.
 This article is a revised version of
my presentation entitled “The Idea of the ‘Aesthetic Life’ in Late Meiji
Japan,” delivered at the 20th International Congress of Aesthetics, in Seoul,
 The reference to “an art of living”
comes from Richard Shusterman, Thinking through the Body: Essays in
Somaesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 21. The
other passages are from Richard Shusterman, Practicing Philosophy:
Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (London and New York: Routledge,
1997), pp. 26, 25.
 Yuriko Saito recently examined the
importance of aesthetic life, especially in regard to Japanese aesthetics, but
without addressing the origin of this concept. Yuriko Saito, “Aesthetics of
Weather,” in Aesthetics of Everyday Life, eds. Andrew Light and Jonathan
M. Smith (New York: Colombia University Press, 2005), pp. 155-176; ref. on p.
164, and “Everyday Aesthetics in the Japanese Tradition,” in Aesthetics of
Everyday Life: East and West, eds. Liu Yuedi and Curtis L. Carter (Newcastle:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), pp. 145-164, ref. on p. 145.
 Part 1, Ch. 1, Sec. 7 of his Aesthetica,
which is unfinished due to the author’s death, is entitled “vita cognitionis
aesthetica.” Alexander Baumgarten, Aesthetica (Frankfurt a. O.:
Johann Christian Kleyb, 1750), n. pag. The passage from Meier is from Georg
Friedrich Meier, Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften (Halle: Carl
Hermann Hemmerde, 1748), § 35, p. 60.
 Friedrich Schiller, On the
Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters. Translated by Elizabeth
M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (London: Oxford University Press), p. 147n.
Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, translated by Walter Lowrie (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 150.
 E.g. Armen Avanessian et al. (ed.), Vita
aesthetica: Szenarien ästhetischer Lebendigkeit (Zürich: Diaphanes, 2009).
 Kinya Masugata, “A Short History of
Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan,” in Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought,
ed. James Giles (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),
pp. 32-52; ref. on p. 34.
 Chogyu Takayama, “Biteki Seikatsu wo
Ronzu (On the Aesthetic Life),” Chogyu Zenshu (Complete Works of Chogyu), Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Hakubun-kan, 1915), § 1, p. 853, my translation.
 Ibid., § 4, pp. 860-861.
 Ibid., § 4, p. 860. The reference to
“following one’s heart” is based on Analects 2:4. The reference to birds and
flower is based on Matthew 6:26/28.
 In the twenty-third letter, Schiller
insists that “there is an aesthetic transcendence (Übertreffen) of
duty.” Schiller, p.167, slightly modified. By the way, Schiller is one of the
few Western philosophers who advocated the aesthetic life: “... the humanity
must be restored to a human being each time anew through the aesthetic life (das
ästhetische Leben).” (Schiller, p. 147n., slightly modified).
 Kakuzo Okakura, The Book of Tea
(1906); Collected English Writings, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Heibonsha Limited,
Publisher, 1984), pp. 289, 290.
 Arthur Danto, “Transfiguration
of the Commonplace,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,
33, 2 (1974), 139-148.
 As for Muneyoshi
(Soetsu) Yanagi, see Tanehisa Otabe, “Mingei-Bewegung
im Hinblick auf die Interkulturalität, ” The Journal of the Faculty of
Letters, The University of Tokyo, Aesthetics, 33 (2008), 45-61.
(Soetsu) Yanagi, “Bi to Seikatsu (Beauty and Life),” Yanagi
Muneyoshi Zenshu (Collected Works of Muneyoshi Yanagi), Vol. 4 (Tokyo:
p. 422, my translation.
 See Tanehisa Otabe, “Tsuneyoshi
Tsuzumi, a Pioneer in Comparative Aesthetics, and His Theory of ‘Framelessness of
Japanese Artistic Style’: Toward Intercultural Aesthetics,” International
Yearbook of Aesthetics, 11 (2007), 111-130.
 Tsuneyoshi Tsuzumi, Nihon Geijutsu
Yoshiki no Kenkyu (A Study of Japanese Artistic Style), (Tokyo:
Shoka-sya, 1933), pp. 77-78, my translation.
 Tsuneyoshi Tsuzumi, Geijutsu Nihon no
Tankyu (A Research into Artistic Japan) (Tokyo: Sogen-sha, 1941), p. 48, my translation.
 Okakura, p. 286, p. 289.
 Motomori Kimura, “Hegeru ni okeru
Geijutsu-bi no idee (The idea of artistic beauty in Hegel),” Bi no Katachi
(Form of Beauty) (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1941), p. 241, my translation.
 Motomori Kimura,
“Ichida no Nomi (A Blow of Chisel),” Hyogen Ai (Expressive Love) (Tokyo:
Iwanami-shoten, 1939), p. 159, my translation.
 Motomori Kimura, Kokka ni Okeru
Bunka to Kyoiku (Culture and Education in State) (Tokyo:
Iwanami-shoten, 1946), p. 148, my translation. See my discussion on this point in Tanehisa Otabe, “Corporeity of
Self-awakening and the Interculturality of Cultural Self-awakening: Motomori
Kimura’s Philosophy of Expression,” International Yearbook of Aesthetics,
14 (2010), 142-159.
 Motomori Kimura, “Hyogen Ai
(Expressive Love),” Hyogen ai (Expressive Love) (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten,
1938), pp. 41-42, my translation.
 Kiyoshi Miki, "Kosoryoku no Ronri
(Logic of Imagination)," Miki Kiyoshi Zenshu (Collected Works of
Kiyoshi Miki), vol. 8 (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1967), p. 223, my translation.
(Soetsu) Yanagi, “Getemono no Bi (The Beauty of the Common Object),” Yanagi
Muneyoshi Zenshu (Collected Works of Muneyoshi Yanagi), vol. 8 (Tokyo:
Chikuma-shobo, 1980), p. 9-10, my translation.
 Takayama, § 4, p. 861.
 Tsuneyoshi Tsuzumi, Nihon Geijutsu
Yoshiki no Kenkyu (A Study of Japanese Artistic Style) (Tokyo:
Shoka-sha, 1933), pp. 613-614, my translation.
 See Richard Shusterman, Thinking
through the Body: Essays in Somaesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), p. 21.
 See Tanehisa Otabe, “On an Aesthetic
Consciousness of our Being: Toward a Contextualization of Shusterman’s
Somaesthetics,” International Yearbook of Aesthetics, 18 (2014),